Branching points for transition pathways: How actors respond to stresses and challenges. by Foxon, TJ et al.
This is a repository copy of Branching points for transition pathways: How actors respond 
to stresses and challenges..
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/85307/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Foxon, TJ, Pearson, PJ, Arapostathis, S et al. (2 more authors) (2013) Branching points 
for transition pathways: How actors respond to stresses and challenges. Energy Policy, 52.
146 - 158. ISSN 0301-4215 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.04.030
© 2013. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/↗
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright 
exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy 
solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The 
publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White 
Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, 
users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
1 
 
Energy Policy special issue on Transition Pathways, Paper 12 
Branching points for transition pathways: assessing responses of actors to challenges on 
pathways to a low carbon future 
Timothy J Foxon1, Peter J. G. Pearson2, Stathis Arapostathis2, Anna Carlsson-Hyslop2 and 
Judith Thornton2 
1Sustainability Research Institute, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, 
Leeds LS2 9JT, UK, t.j.foxon@leeds.ac.uk 
2Low Carbon Research Institute, Welsh School of Architecture, Cardiff University, Cardiff 
CF10 3NB, UK. 
Abstract 
This paper describes initial analysis of branching points on a set of transition pathways to a 
UK low carbon electricity future by 2050. As described in other papers in this special issue, 
we are exploring and analysing a set of core transition pathways, based on alternative 
JRYHUQDQFH SDWWHUQV LQ ZKLFK WKH µORJLFV¶ RI PDUNHW DFWRUV JRYHUQPHQW DFWRUV DQG FLYLO
society actors respectively dominate. This core pathway analysis is enhanced by analyses of 
branching points within and across the pathways, which informs how competition between 
different logics plays out at key decision points. Branching points are defined as key decision 
points at which choices made by actors, in response to internal or external stresses or triggers, 
determine whether and in what ways the pathway is followed. A set of initial branching 
points for our three core transition pathways is identified through project and stakeholder 
ZRUNVKRSVDQGGUDZLQJRQDQDO\VLVRIDFWRUV¶ choices and responses at past branching points 
in energy system transitions. The potential responses of the actors are identified at these 
branching points, and risk mitigation strategies are formulated for the dominant actors to 
reinforce that pathway, as well as opportunities for actors to move away from the pathway.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper describes initial analysis of branching points on a set of transition pathways to a 
UK low carbon electricity future by 2050 (Foxon et al., 2010; Foxon, 2012, this volume). As 
laid down in the Climate Act 2008, the UK aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80 
per cent on 1990 levels, throXJKSKDVHGµFDUERQEXGJHWV¶. Moving to more efficient delivery 
of electricity generated from low-carbon sources is expected to play a key role in achieving 
these goals. This set of transition pathways has been developed by applying a multi-level 
perspective for analysing transitions in socio-technical systems (Geels, 2002, 2005a, 2011; 
Grin et al., 2010), augmented by related work on a coevolutionary framework for analysing 
low-carbon transitions (Foxon, 2011). This approach emphasises that pathways arise through 
and can be shaped by DFWRUV¶ decisions, drawing on insights into how the contingency of 
actors¶ GHFLVLRQV and coevolutionary processes can be usefully incorporated into scenario 
thinking (Hughes et al., 2012, this volume). These decisions are enabled and constrained by a 
range of structural factors, and are made under conditions of high uncertainty. This reflects 
the evidence from historical studies that technological systems change is path dependent, 
such that the state of the system at any time is sensitive to events and decisions made along 
the way, and is not predictable on the basis of optimality conditions (David, 1985, 1997; 
Arthur, 1989, 1994). The paper thus aims to inform how decision-making by actors 
influences whether a particular pathway is followed, or a branch to another pathway may 
occur, in the context of analysis of future transition pathways. 
 
Uncertainty and path dependence present a challenge to the development and analysis of 
plausible scenarios or pathways towards particular futures, including a transition to a low 
carbon electricity system. One approach, commonly applied in techno-economic modelling, 
is to develop and analyse scenarios meeting some optimality condition, DV µLGHDO W\SHV¶ IRU
comparison. Whilst this approach is valuable, there is a danger that it might lead to scenarios 
that underplay the path dependence and actor contingency of technological systems change, 
and hence give a misleading picture of how such change might occur and how the 
consequences of different decisions might play out. Hence, our work takes an alternative 
approach of first developing and analysing transition pathway narratives based on more 
µUHDOLVWLF¶GHFLVLRQ-making processes, and then undertaking a process of quantification of the 
narratives.  Consequently, unlike scenarios developed from cost optimising techno-economic 
models, our transition pathways do not assume that actors will optimise any utility function.   
 
We have developed and analysed a set of three core transition pathways to 2050. Our starting 
SRLQWLVWKDWWKHJRYHUQDQFHIUDPLQJVRUµORJLFV¶RINH\DFWRUVZLOOEHDFUXFLDO LQIOXHQFHRQ
any pathway towards a future low-carbon energy system. We have distinguished the logics of 
three core sets of actors: those of the market, government and civil society. Accordingly, in 
our three core transition pathways, named Market Rules, Central Co-ordination and 
Thousand Flowers HDFK SDWKZD\ LV GRPLQDWHG E\ D VLQJOH JURXS¶V ORJLF In these core 
pathways, we assume that the dominant logic is reinforced at decision points, giving rise to a 
path dependent evolution of the technological and institutional features of the pathway, as 
described in Foxon (2012, this volume). The branching points analysis seeks to examine in 
more detail the processes that give rise to the dominant logic either being reinforced or 
challenged at these decision points. Pathways reflect the outcomes of multitudes of decisions 
made by interacting actors along the way. At key decision points, actors make choices that 
depend on the magnitude and timing of pressures and the openness and capability of regime 
actors to respond to them. These key points represeQWPDMRUFKDOOHQJHVHLWKHUWRDSDWKZD\¶V
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dominant logic or to the ways in which that logic is pursued. Thus we define a branching 
point as a key decision point on a pathway at which actors¶ choices, made in response to 
internal or external pressures, determine whether and in what ways the pathway is followed. 
However, it is important to note that pathways and branching points are emergent properties, 
and so actors may not be consciously deciding to pursue a particular branch or pathway, but 
rather to address particular challenges as they see them at that point in time. The path 
dependence literature argues that particular choices at one point may result in later choices 
being constrained, giving rise to an identifiable branch or pathway. 
 
We are interested in using these ideas to investigate the robustness of our core transition 
pathways. If the actors that are following the dominant logic in a pathway have the capacity 
to respond to pressures at a branching point, then that pathway is likely to be reinforced, as in 
our core transition pathways. However, internal or external events may result in the dominant 
logic in a pathway being challenged, leading to branching to another path or failure to realise 
a transition along that pathway. In this paper, we identify and analyse such branching points. 
 
In order both to test and refine the approach and to explore the decisions made by regime 
actors at two periods in which significantly different logics dominated, we first apply 
branching point analysis to past experiences of the UK gas regime, drawing on historical case 
studies described in detail in Arapostathis et al. (2012, this volume). In these cases, we 
identified branching points at which challenges arose to the ways in which the dominant 
market or government logic was pursued, without necessarily challenging that logic. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses in more detail theoretical and 
conceptual issues relating to branching points, drawing on the technological lock-in and 
historical institutionalism literatures. Section 3 looks at the lessons that can be learned from 
analysis of past branching points in historical transitions, through two case studies from the 
UK gas industry. Section 4 describes the process and methodology used to select a set of key 
branching points on our core pathways. Section 5 analyses the potential responses of actors 
and risk mitigation strategies at these selected branching points, drawing on insights from 
stakeholder workshops. Section 6 discusses how the analysis of branching points might 
inform thinking and decision making processes for actors from policy, business and civil 
society. Section 7 concludes and sets out the next steps for the analysis. 
 
2. Theoretical issues ± path dependence, lock-in and path creation 
A range of evidence from socio-technical, historical, institutional and evolutionary economic 
analysis can help us to understand transitions in technological and related systems, and the 
LPSOLFDWLRQVRIDFWRUV¶GHFLVLRQVZLWKLQ WUDQVLWLRQV7KLVHYLGHQFH highlights that long-term 
WHFKQRORJLFDOFKDQJHLV³uncertain, dynamic, systemic and cumulative´*UXEOHU p. 21; 
Rosenberg, 1982, 1994; T. Hughes, 1983; Mokyr, 1990; Freeman and Louca, 2001; Geels, 
2005a). These authors argue that uncertainty is fundamental because of the many inter-related 
individual and institutional decisions that affect technological change. The poor record of 
forecasting of even the broad characteristics of future energy systems provides strong 
evidence for this (Smil, 2005). Technological change is dynamic as it involves replacement 
over time of capital stock as stock ages and economies expand, and the injection of new 
technological possibilities arising from inventions and innovation. The systemic nature of 
technological evolution extends not only to the inter-relations between technologies, but also 
to the institutions, business strategies and social practices with which technologies coevolve 
(Nelson, 2005; Beinhocker, 2005; Arthur, 2009; Foxon, 2011). Finally, technological change 
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is cumulative, as it builds on previous experience and knowledge, both of what works 
technically and of what is socially acceptable and desirable. 
 
A key aspect of long-term technological systems change is that it is path dependent, i.e. the 
present and future evolution of a technological system depends sensitively on the particular 
historical sequence of events that led to its current state. In his investigation of path 
dependence, economic historian Paul David DUJXHG WKDW ³$ path-dependent sequence of 
economic changes is one in which important influences upon the eventual outcome can be 
exerted by temporally remote events, including happenings dominated by chance elements, 
UDWKHU WKDQ V\VWHPLF IRUFHV  ,Q VXFK FLUFXPVWDQFHV µKLVWRULFDO DFFLGHQWV¶ FDn neither be 
ignored, nor neatly quarantined for the purposes of economic analysis; the dynamic process 
itself takes on an essentially historical character´ 'DYLG ). This implies that a 
SDUWLFXODUVWDWHRIWKHV\VWHPPD\EHµORFNHGLQ¶DVDUHVXOWRI particular historical accidents, 
creating barriers to moving to an alternative state, even though the conditions that led to that 
lock-in are no longer relevant. He illustrated this with the famous example of the QWERTY 
keyboard layout design (David, 1985). This originated in the design of early mechanical 
typewriter keyboards, ostensibly to slow-down typists to prevent adjacent keys from 
jamming. Because of certain historical factors, such as most typists being trained on this 
layout, the switching costs to another design increased. Even though alternative layouts have 
been proposed and claimed to be more ergonomically efficient, the QWERTY design is still 
ubiquitous on nearly all modern computers and electronic information devices. Arthur (1989, 
1994) identified four types of increasing returns to adoption that can lead to this type of 
WHFKQRORJLFDO µORFN-LQ¶ scale, learning, adaptation and network effects. These increasing 
returns can then result in technical and social advantages accruing to the incumbent 
technology, so delaying or preventing the adoption of a potentially superior alternative 
technology.  
 
The insights from historical approaches to understanding long-term technological change are 
reinforced by those from evolutionary and institutional economics. From this perspective, 
North (1990) argued that the four types of increasing returns, identified in relation to the 
adoption of technologies, also apply to the adoption of institutions, understood as social rule 
systems. Pierson (2000) argued that increasing returns would be particularly prevalent in 
political institutions, such as market or regulatory frameworks. These frameworks are 
typically difficult to implement initially as they require co-ordination between many actors, 
but if this collective action problem can be overcome, then actors tend to adapt their 
behaviour and expectations to the new rules, and so acquire an interest in these rules being 
maintained. Hence, legally binding rule-systems are subject to learning, adaptation and co-
ordination effects, and so become difficult to change, once implemented. In particular, actors 
that have power under the current rule-system will try to use this power to ensure that the 
rules that enhance their interests are maintained. Historical analysis of political institutions 
KDVDOVRLGHQWLILHGµFULWLFDOMXQFWXUHV¶- crucial founding moments relating to the formation of 
institutions that send countries along broadly different political development paths (Collier 
and Collier, 1991; Scokpol, 1992; Ikenberry, 1994). In a perceptive review of this literature, 
Thelen (1999) argues that this type of historical institutional analysis could be used to 
examine in a coherent way both the formation of institutions and the processes that sustain 
and reproduce these institutions. 
 
These insights suggest that analysis of processes of co-evolution of technologies and 
institutions can inform how techno-institutional systems form and the conditions under which 
they may become locked-in (Foxon, 2007, 2011). Unruh (2000, 2002; Unruh and Carrillo-
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Hermosilla, 2006) argued that such a process of co-evolution of technologies and institutions 
has led to the lock-LQRIFXUUHQWKLJKFDUERQHQHUJ\V\VWHPVWHUPHGµFDUERQORFN-LQ¶, through 
mutually reinforcing positive feedbacks to the adoption of high carbon technologies and 
supporting regulatory institutions and user practices. Co-evolutionary thinking thus highlights 
the difficulty in moving away from a pathway that has widespread support, particularly 
amongst powerful actors. It also shows that rapid change is possible if increasing returns to 
WKHDGRSWLRQRIDQDOWHUQDWLYHDSSURDFKFDQEHLQVWLJDWHGOHDGLQJWRWKHFUHDWLRQRIµYLUWXRXV
F\FOHV¶RIFKDQJH6WHQ]HODQG)UHQ]HO6XXUVDQG+HNNHUW)R[RQ 
 
Whilst historical lock-in can be eventually overcome, this is likely, but not necessary, to 
require strategic action by markets actors and/or governments. Indeed, while acknowledging 
the relevance of path dependence, Garud and Karnoe (2001) suggested it to be problematic in 
UHODWLRQ WR HQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS 7KLV LV EHFDXVH LWV SURSRQHQWV ³UHOHJDWH KXPDQ DJHQF\ WR
choosing to go with a flow of events that actors have little power WRLQIOXHQFHLQUHDOWLPH´
They argued instead for path-creation, D SURFHVV RI ³PLQGIXO GHYLDWLRQ´ LQ ZKLFK
entrepreneurs, although constrained, may choose to depart from structures they jointly create, 
³LQ D FROOHFWLYH HIIRUW ZKHUH SDWKV DUH FRQWLQXDOO\ DQG SURJUHVVLYHO\ PRGLILHG DV QHZ
WHFKQRORJLFDOILHOGVHPHUJH´*DUXGDQG.DUQRHS. Historical studies also suggest 
that lock-in can be avoided through the formation of a diverse range of alternative 
technological options, whilst ensuring that promising options benefit from sufficient 
increasing returns and learning effects to enable them to challenge the dominant technologies 
(Foray, 1997; van den Bergh et al., 2006, 2007; Gross, 2008).  
 
Nevertheless, although a range of studies suggest positive roles for entrepreneurs and other 
actors in overcoming lock-in, the development of low carbon pathways requires investment 
in risky R&D, demonstration projects and early stage commercialisation of new technologies. 
This is against a backdrop of uncertain revenues, including the price of carbon and the 
probability that many initially promising options will fail to achieve full scale 
commercialisation. Hence, support for option creation and testing raises dilemmas for market 
actors and policy-makers. The former may lack sufficent incentives to engage in socially 
desirable levels of risky investment and experimentation, a classic public good problem. The 
latter worry about overcompensating market actors from the public purse and choosing which 
technologies, activities and policy instruments to support, in the face of uncertain electoral 
backing. 
 
Our approach to transition pathways is set within a substantial tradition of historical work on 
energy and emergent socio-technical transitions, particularly within the so-called Multi Level 
Perspective (MLP) (e.g. Geels, 2002, 2005a,b, 2006; Geels and Schot, 2007; Verbong and 
Geels, 2007; Shackley and Green 2005). We argue that using the concept of branching points 
as a tool to understand emergent transitions can enrich existing approaches, balancing micro 
and meso-historical approaches. MLP studies of historical transitions identify critical 
moments in the transition pathway when the regime experiences pressures from landscape 
developments or emerging niche innovations. During those situations, regime actors decide to 
respond, implementing changes in the regime. Despite the temporal and spatial dimension 
that MLP gives to those critical situations, the approach provides limited explicit focus on the 
decision making processes, the variety of choices, the considerations of the various actors or 
the relations of power that developed during the points when choices had to be made. 
However, Geels and Schot (2008) have argued that the agency of actors can be incorporated 
more explicitly within the multi-level perspective, in relation to actions leading to path 
creation. Drawing on these and other leading historical and sociological analyses of long-
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term technological change (e.g. Bijker, 1997; Cowan, 1999; Hughes, 1983), we argue that 
branching point analysis could offer a systematic way of looking at critical moments in 
transitions.  
 
Thomas Hughes identifies five stages in the evolution of large scale technological system: 
invention, research and development; technological transfer; system growth; technological 
momentum; and, finally, planned regional systems. He intrRGXFHG WKH FRQFHSW RI µUHYHUVH
VDOLHQW¶ WR GHQRWH FULWLFDO MXQFWLRQV LQ V\VWHP HYROXWLRQ SDUWLFXODUO\ DW WKH VWDJH RI JURZWK
when components of the system are lagging and the system builder has to transform the 
situations into critical problems ± technological, institutional, political or social ± and search 
for solutions. During these conditions, a process involving decision making and problem 
solving strategies is important (Hughes, 1983: 6- HVS  $OWKRXJK +XJKHV¶ DQDO\VLV
gives due emphasis to the social processes of decision making, it does not explicitly address 
the issue of governance, or exactly how the identification of µUHYHUVH VDOLHQWV¶ can act as 
windows of opportunity for the system builders. Sociological approaches that endorse system 
analysis while also stressing the importance of uses and users in socio-technical transitions 
KDYH IRFXVHG RQ µFRQVXPSWLRQ MXQFWLRQV¶ 7KHVH DUH SODFHV DQG PRPHQWV ³DW ZKLFK WKH
consumer makes choices between competing technologies´, and for which the researcher 
VKRXOG³try to ascertain how the network may have looked when viewed from the inside out, 
which elements stood out as being more important, more determinative of choices, than the 
others, and which paths seemed wise to pursue and which too dangerous tR FRQWHPSODWH´
(Cowan, 1999:263). This approach is valuable in that it emphasises DFWRUV¶FKRLFHVDQGWKHLU
contribution to the domestication of specific technologies. However, it focuses exclusively at 
the consumer-end of the regime and does not encompass actors from all domains and aspects 
of the regime.  
  
In this paper, we seek to apply these ideas to the analysis of future transition pathways. This 
builds on the use of similar ideas in the scenarios literature (Hughes et al, 2012, this volume). 
For exaPSOH .DKQ DQG :LHQHU  UHIHU WR WKH ³HYHQWV DQG EUDQFKLQJ SRLQWV >LQ
VFHQDULRV@ GHSHQGHQW XSRQ FULWLFDO FKRLFHV´ DQG GH -RXYHQHO  DQDO\VHV ³SRLQWV RI
IXOFUXP´ DW ZKLFK DFWRUV¶ FKRLFHV FDQ LQIOXHQFH IXWXUH RXWFRPHV Bearing in mind the 
potential constraints of path dependence and the opportunities for path creation in relation to 
our low carbon transition pathways, we analyse in detail a small number of branching points 
along these pathways, examining the potential responses of all key actors within the system at 
these points. As noted, we define a branching point as a key decision point on a pathway at 
which choices made by actors, in response to internal or external pressures, determine 
whether and in what ways the pathway is followed. This analysis does not set out to predict 
branching points, but rather to explore plausible branching points, with the aim of informing 
how actors might develop strategies to prepare for potential future events, contingencies and 
opportunities and plan appropriate responses consistent with their long-term goals. The 
analysis is informed by insights provided by current actors in the energy system, and from the 
analysis of how energy system actors responded to historical branching points in earlier 
energy system transitions. 
 
3. Application to Transition Pathways 
As noted, in order to investigate how actions by actors could give rise to a transition to a UK 
low carbon electricity system by 2050, through the use of a coevolutionary, multi-level 
framework, the project has developed and analysed three core transition pathways (Foxon, 
2012, this volume). We are particular interested in the governance challenges that actors face, 
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where µJRYHUQDQFH¶KHUHUHIHUVWRWKHVWUXFWXUHVDQGSURFHVVHVWKDWLQIOXHQFHGHFLVLRQVPDGH
by different actors within the system, and in how their choices give rise to changes to the 
system (Smith, 2009). 7KHSURMHFWWHDPGHYHORSHGDQµDFWLRQVSDFH¶DSSURDFKIRUDQDO\VLQJ
the governance interactions between three key groups of actors ± government actors, market 
actors and civil society actors. In this approach, as outlined earlier, different types of actors 
IROORZGLIIHUHQWXQGHUO\LQJµORJLFV¶WKDWIUDPHWKHLUYLHZRIWKHZRUOGDQGRIRWKHUDFWRUVDQG
VHHNWRµHQURO¶RWKHUVLQWRWKHLU ORJLF, thus giving rise to competition between logics (Figure 
1). 
 
 
Market  
µORJLF¶ 
Government  
µORJLF¶ 
Civil Society  
µORJLF¶ 
? 
 
Figure 1. 3DWWHUQV RI JRYHUQDQFH WKH DFWLRQ VSDFH IRU FRPSHWLQJ µORJLFV¶ LQ D WUDQVLWLRQ 
(Source: Foxon, 2012, this volume). 
 
In order to investigate a small number of core pathways in detail, we defined three transition 
pathways to a UK low carbon electricity system, in which one of each of the three competing 
logics dominates. Thus, we have a market-led pathway, named Market Rules, a government-
led pathway, Central Co-ordination, and a civil society-led pathway, Thousand Flowers. 
However, in reality, there are messy and dynamic processes of interaction between competing 
logicsDVSDWKGHSHQGHQWSURFHVVHVRIFKDQJHSOD\RXWWKURXJKDFWRUV¶ choices and structural 
changes. In order to investigate this competition between logics, in Section 5 of this paper, 
we focus particularly on those branching points at which this competition leads to a challenge 
to the dominant logic in a pathway. 
 
As there has been relatively little analysis of branching points in this way, and valuable 
insights might be drawn from a longer run perspective, we also applied and tested our 
approach through studying past energy transitions and branching points in them. Initial 
historical studies have included research on the history of the use of gas to provide lighting, 
cooking and heating services (see Arapostathis et al. 2012, this volume, for more detail). 
Here, we chose to analyse two UK transitions under contrasting governance modes/logics: an 
essentially market-led transition in the spread of gas to a wider range of users and services in 
the late 19th/early 20th century; and a government-led transition from manufactured gas to 
natural gas in the second half of the 20th century. In each transition, we identified branching 
points at which the regime actors had to make choices and had the power to take decisions 
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which significantly shaped the pathways taken. In these cases, the branching points resulted 
in the reinforcement of the dominant logic, rather than its overthrow, and so contributed to 
specific transition pathways. Thus these historical examples shed light on the factors that 
enabled the reinforcement of the dominant logic at the branching points. In future work, we 
propose to investigate how different choices by actors might have led to different outcomes in 
these cases, by comparing the historical experience of the UK with that of other countries 
who faced similar challenges at these times. We will also explore branching points in the past 
development of the UK electricity regime. 
 
3.1.  Branching points on the pathway of the manufactured gas regime 1877-1914 
As described by Arapostathis et al. (2012, this volume), the development of domestic use of 
manufactured gas to include a greater range of energy services by a wider range of British 
customers represents a broadly market-led transition. By around 1880, gas manufactured 
from coal was used by two million commercial and middle class customers, primarily for 
lighting. Gas was produced by private companies and municipal µundertakings¶. Financially 
the municipal and private organisations behaved in broadly similar ways, both being profit-
driven, albeit with different uses for those profits: as dividends for the private companies, and 
to pay for municipal improvements or reductions in council rates for municipal undertakings 
(Millward, 1991, 2000). As both sets operated within the market logic, while using it for their 
RZQSXUSRVHVWKH\DUHKHUHMRLQWO\UHIHUUHGWRDVµFRPSDQLHV¶  
 
During the decades after 1880, the companies and other actors within the manufactured gas 
regime faced a range of pressures, including competition from developments in electric bulb 
lighting (Fouquet and Pearson, 2006), low load factors due to low daytime demand and 
negative customer perceptions of gas. Such pressures, as well as a general search for 
increased profits, led to branching points, in response to which various decisions were taken 
by the dominant actors, the companies, which, in this case, reinforced the pathway towards 
the use of manufactured gas by wider parts of the population for a greater range of energy 
services. The Branching Points and the decisions in response to them are summarised in 
Table 1.  
 
 Choices made at branching 
points  
Key actors and their location 
in the governance system 
Outcome for the transition pathway 
Branching point 1: Perceived need to promote and increase the range of energy services supplied by 
gas 
To organise trade exhibitions to 
promote gas appliances (ca late 
1870s) 
Private and municipal gas 
undertakings (central) and 
appliance manufacturers 
(increasingly important)  
The beginning of increased emphasis 
on advertising and promotion of 
appliances  W shift towards supplying 
more varied services 
To organise the 1882-3 gas 
exhibition 
Private and municipal gas 
undertakings (central) 
Increased emphasis on advertising 
amongst undertakings   W shift 
towards supplying more varied 
services 
To introduce hiring of appliances 
(taken up widely in 1880s) 
Private and municipal gas 
undertakings (central)  
Continued the shift towards 
supplying more varied services 
Branching point 2: Perceived need to broaden the customer base 
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To introduce prepayment meters 
(from 1889) 
Private and municipal gas 
undertakings (central) and 
appliance manufacturers 
(increasingly important) 
Shifted the regime to increasingly 
include the working classes and 
continued the shift towards 
supplying more varied services as 
cookers were hired out with 
prepayment meters  
Branching point 3: Perceived need to compete on price and quality 
To introduce incandescent gas 
mantles (from 1898) 
Private and municipal gas 
undertakings (central) 
Strengthened the competitive 
position of gas light, so regime 
continued supplying this energy 
service 
Jointly mounting a legal fight 
against the holder of the British 
Welsbach mantle patent (1901) 
Private and municipal gas 
undertakings (central) 
Strengthened the competitive 
position of gas light, so regime 
continued supplying this energy 
service 
 
Table 1. Choices made at branching points in the manufactured gas regime, 1877-1914 
 
As a result of these choices and actions by the municipal and private gas companies, by 1914, 
the manufactured gas regime had undergone a transition to providing a wider range of 
services, including not only lighting but also cooking. Gas customers had more than tripled in 
numbers, to 7 million, and now included a growing number of working class households. The 
transition was led by actors operating in the market logic: the companies, whose decisions are 
listed in Table 1. The government had a limited role in the transition, setting the regulatory 
context but neither promoting nor discouraging the transition. Similarly, civil society actors 
do not appear to have actively argued against the FRPSDQLHV¶decisions but instead supported 
them by e.g., renting appliances, using slot meters or gas mantles. Some groups also 
encouraged the use of gas cookers amongst working class households as a way of improving 
health (Clendinning, 2004). 
 
The companies usually took their decisions individually (e.g., each decided individually to 
introduce prepayment meters or gas mantles), but sometimes they decided to cooperate (e.g. 
regarding the 1882-3 exhibition). The companies took different decisions for different 
reasons but overall they operated within the market logic, which led to particular, profit-
motivated, decisions being taken and thus gave a specific character to the transition pathway. 
It ZDVVKDSHGE\WKHFRPSDQLHV¶GHVLUHWRLQFUHDVHVDOHVRIJDVWKURXJKWKHLUchoices, e.g. by 
promoting gas cooking and increasing customer numbers, and also to retain their share of the 
lighting market through the use of the more-efficient gas mantles. The decisions led to path-
dependency, in the sense that future decisions were limited by WKH FRPSDQLHV¶ FKRLFHV WR
develop their markets in particular ways. The industry did not look back from the promotion 
of non-lighting uses of gas through appliance hire, nor from the introduction of prepayment 
meters, once these decisions had taken hold in the regime. For example, the companies 
continued for decades to develop their market through advertising and other promotional 
tactics, such as the use of lady demonstrators and prepayment meters. 
 
Although charges for prepayment meters and appliance hire did not always cover the 
FRPSDQLHV¶ FRVWV RI SURYLVLRQ requiring cross-subsidy from gas sales, the companies 
continued on this path, partly as there was high demand from consumers and partly because 
they seem to have seen no other way of doing things (Goodall, 1999:ch 9). This illustrates 
how decisions at branching points may lead to path-dependent trajectories that with hindsight 
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appear sub-optimal, as discussed in section 2. The companies also took particular decisions 
about capital costs, which may be not unusual in market-led transitions. New machinery, 
offering lower production costs, was only introduced as old plant wore out (Matthews, 1983, 
1987). Companies did not strand their assets even though this might have led to higher 
profits.  
 
How do these historic branching points link with the prospective transition pathways? From 
this case, we can see that in a market-led transition with multiple players and imperfect 
information, heterogeneity in decision making might be expected ± for example, some 
companies did not think it was worth selling gas to working class customers and were (at 
least initially) against introducing prepayment meters, whilst others wished to increase 
working class custom and decided to experiment with prepayment (Goodall, 1999). In a 
market-led transition there is the potential, in the absence of high barriers to entry, for 
diffusion of power amongst a wide range of actors, in this case the many hundreds of 
companies of different sizes and financial power, as well as other actors. The changes 
resulting from the decisions of many actors operating within the market logic may differ, 
both in form and content, from change that happens when fewer actors in a different 
governance logic make choices. For example, having a range of actors with potentially 
different approaches enables the creation of more options and more diverse choices, although 
such diffusion may also mean that increasing returns develop less rapidly.  
 
 
3.2. Branching points on the pathway of manufactured to natural gas regime 1948-
1977 
Arapostathis et al. (2012, this volume) also show how the transition from manufactured gas to 
the use of natural gas for energy services in the second half of the 20th Century was a more 
government-led transition. A small number of players and a dominant government logic 
drove through a major transition in technology, institutions and infrastructures. In this case, 
tKHSUHYDOHQWµORJLF¶SULRULWLsed state planning, fuel policy, capacity building, energy security 
and consumer safety, as well as security of investments. The regime was able to achieve, in a 
relatively short time, a transition that required a high level of co-ordination. This led to the 
emergence of a four fuel economy in the UK, with large roles for petroleum, coal, natural 
gas, and primary electricity from hydro and nuclear power (Geels and Turnheim, 2010). 
 
In 1948, the UK gas industry was nationalised, because of its perceived strategic importance 
and socio-cultural and political changes after World War II that favoured greater state 
intervention. In the post-1948 period, the gas industry experienced exogenous and 
endogenous challenges: the high cost of manufacture of gas from coal and market 
competition from other energy sources, particularly electricity (Curwen, 1986: 25-26, 28; 
Millward, 1997; Williams, 1981: 89-119). While economies of scale were pursued through 
the centralisation and concentration of production, this was deemed inadequate to ensure the 
continued dominant role of gas for energy services. Regime actors, which were by then state-
owned companies and agencies, responded by introducing niche technologies at the end-use 
and the production side, helping to determine the character of this transition. Several niche 
technologies were tried in order to improve the economics and the competitiveness of 
manufactured gas, leading to Branching Point 1 identified in Table 2.  
 
In the political and institutional setting established from the nationalisation of the gas 
industry, the relation between the Gas Council and the Area Boards was characterized as an 
µH[SHULPHQW LQFRRSHUDWLRQE\FRQVHQW¶*DV&RXQFLO:KLOHWKH$UHD%RDUGVKDG
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sufficient independence to manage and develop the gas networks and set regional fuel policy, 
the Gas Council acquired the jurisdiction, authority and power to make major decisions for 
the system as a whole. Thus they were able to plan, develop and coordinate R&D initiatives 
and activities for the production of gas from alternative sources, to assess the relevant 
technologies and to establish the setting for the economic, political and technological trend 
away from coal as the core feedstock in the manufactured gas regime.      
 
 
Table 2 Choices made at branching points in the transition from manufactured to natural gas  
regime, 1948-1977 
Choices made at branching points  Key actors and their location 
in the governance system 
Outcome for the transition pathway 
Branching Point 1: Perceived need to expand the market and diversify sources of gas in response to pressures from 
higher coal costs and competition from electricity, coal and oil 
Promotion of central and space 
heating (1960s) 
Gas Council, Area Boards, 
Appliance manufacturers (e.g. 
Shell). Decision mostly at the 
level of Gas Council & the local 
Boards 
Reinforcement of the incumbent regime, 
creation of new markets; increase of 
inherent pressures on the production 
side particularly for the Metropolitan 
Boards  
Introduction of the Lurgi process 
(1960s) 
Gas Council and Area Boards, 
National Coal Board, Ministry 
of Power. Decisions made both 
by Gas Council & the local 
Boards. Ministry of Power 
followed their policy 
suggestions  
Niche technology for local problems. 
Internal adaptation, renewal & 
reconfiguration 
Introduction of oil gasification 
processes (1960-1970) 
Gas Council, Area Boards & 
Ministry of Power. Decisions 
made both by Gas Council & 
the local Boards. Ministry of 
Power followed their policy 
suggestions  
Re-alignment of the regime/dominant 
technology in the late 1960s 
Early experimental LNG 
transportation (1957-1960) 
Ministry of Power, Gas Council, 
London Boards (North Thames 
Board, South Eastern  Board, ), 
Constock International 
Methane Ltd. Centralised 
decision making process 
Experimental phase important for the 
enrolment of key actors to the use of 
LNG in a wider scale 
LNG pipeline (1961) 
 
Gas Council, Area Boards, 
Ministry of Power. Centralised 
decision making process 
Niche technology for local problem & 
critical infrastructure. Reconfiguration of 
the pathway through hybridisation 
North Sea Exploration and search for 
natural gas (mid 1960s and 1970s) 
Combination initiatives by the 
state & private oil/gas 
companies; Gas Council key 
actor through involvement 
both in the production & the 
exclusive supply of gas 
nationwide.  
Landscape pressure on the incumbent 
regime. Technological substitution 
 
Branching Point 2: Perceived opportunity to respond to the discovery of North Sea gas 
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Establishment of monopsony by the 
Gas Council in the UK natural gas 
regime (mid 1960s) 
Government & Gas Council Reinforced the centralisation of the 
regime & the state-led transition 
The decision of the conversion as a 
single operation with no intermediate 
phase or period (1966) 
Government, Gas Council & to 
a lesser degree the Area 
Boards. Centrally taken 
decision 
Conversion to natural gas (1967-1977). 
Facilitated & provided a fast pace to the 
 ?ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?
Pilot Schemes for local conversion 
(1967-1977) 
 
Gas Council and Area Boards. 
Decisions were made both 
centralised and at local level. 
Local Boards played important 
role in successful 
implementation of the pilot 
schemes.   
&ĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĞ ?ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
ƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ?Ɛ ?& 
enrolling new actors. There were 
pressures in the new regime and reaction 
by actors of the incumbent regime  W 
almost exclusively by the public.  The 
schemes were established among other 
things as demonstrations to persuade 
the general public to support the new 
regime.  
 ?'ƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞĚtĂƌŵƚŚ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ
(1969) 
Gas Council & Area Boards. 
National promotion campaign  
Important for the enrolment to the new 
regime 
Commissioning of the Morton Report 
(1970) 
Government & Gas Council Important for the enrolment of new 
actors (the general public)  
Gas Act 1972 Parliament, Government, Gas 
Council 
Reinforced the centralisation of the 
regime & the state-led transition 
 
 
 
The Lurgi process for manufacturing gas from lower grade coal was introduced by local Area 
Boards. The process did not progress beyond a niche technology, however, because its 
scaling up was assessed as economically infeasible and the Gas Council and the National 
Coal Board chose not to recommend further development. Despite the stake that the coal 
industry could have had as fuel supplier for the Lurgi process (Posner, 1973:66), the 
assessment informed the transition pathway by delineating the scale and the scope at which 
the process could contribute to gas production (Gas Council, 1964: 19-20; Williams, 1981: 
121-125). The oil based processes proved more economic and quickly replaced coal based 
processes and related infrastructures in the 1960s, providing what proved to be an 
intermediate solution to maintaining the gas supply industry and opening up opportunities for 
further changes.  
 
In the same period, imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) became a hybrid niche technology. 
It was introduced to solve local problems in London, but the scaling up and the establishment 
of a natural gas pipeline, which linked eight Area Gas Boards with the terminals for imported 
LNG, was promoted by the Gas Council as a planned transition. It aimed to provide high 
quality gas for the next fifteen years to regional systems, thus enabling the Area Boards to 
reduce the cost of gas supply (Gas Council, 1962:9).  While the decision was made in order 
to reinforce the incumbent gas supply regime and address the cumulative pressures it faced, 
the natural gas pipeline constructed for imported LNG facilitated the integration of North Sea 
natural gas into the British energy mix, following the discovery of large gas reserves there in 
the 1960s. 
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The new LNG grid was the critical infrastructure that, along with the expectations 
surrounding the exploration for natural gas in the North Sea, provided the conditions for the 
H[LVWLQJJDV UHJLPH¶V UHVSRQVH WR the window of opportunity that the natural gas discovery 
offered, leading to Branching Point 2 in Table 2. This enabled a decision by the state-owned 
gas industry actors to formulate a 10-year plan for the conversion of gas supply and all 
domestic appliances from manufactured gas to natural gas. The decision to convert all 
appliances to natural gas rather than reforming it to resemble manufactured gas was 
determined by several factors: the aspirations for a national fuel policy based heavily on 
natural gas; the initial positive indicators about the extent of the North Sea gas resources; the 
existence of the nascent LNG grid; and the UHJLPH¶V economic gains through avoiding the 
operating cost of the reforming plants and investments in the upgrading of the existing gas 
manufacturing plants (Tiratsoo, 1972: 211-212; Posner, 1973: 69-70). The change involved 
the stranding of existing infrastructure assets, the enactment of strategies for the enrolment of 
more actors to the new regime, and the requirement for domestic actors to allow members of 
an army of newly-trained technicians to enter their homes to convert their appliances to run 
on natural gas. In this case, the government-led nature of the transition enabled a high level of 
co-ordination between different actors and the imposition on some unwilling actors, such as 
householders, in order to achieve a transition that both government and industry - natural gas 
companies, appliance manufacturers, gas engineering institutes - agreed would be beneficial 
for society as a whole. However, at key points, the nature of the government-led system had 
also allowed experimentation in niches as to the most desirable alternative source of gas, 
which then helped to enable the chosen transition pathway to natural gas. In our view, 
moreover, the willingness of the gas regime to undertake a new, more intrusive form of 
engagement with its domestic customers, offers insights into the challenges likely to be faced 
by the introduction of smart meters and controls.  
 
While future branching points will of course not be like those in the historic cases described 
here, there will be some similarities. For example, the role of different actors will be 
complex. While logic-leading actors dominate, other actors, such as the local authority town 
gas corporations in the early case, are enrolled into the dominant logic and behave 
accordingly, operating as profit-motivated entities and taking decisions accordingly. At the 
same time, some actors do not behave according to the dominant µORJLF¶ The historical cases 
show that real transitions are far from being linear and well structured as those in idealised 
pathways of future scenarios. They are characterized by uncertainties, ambivalences, 
FRPSHWLQJ µORJLFV¶ DQG KHWHURJHQHLW\ DV ZHOO DV DFWV IRU Whe establishment of one specific 
µORJLF¶DQGWKHDFKLHYHPHQWRIKRPRJHQHLW\It is crucial to integrate historical transitions in 
the analysis because they not only highlight the complexity and the messiness of the past but 
they make clear that relations and acts of power defined dRPLQDQWµORJLFV¶DQGVRFLDORUGHUV
Power was enforced by substantial institutional change (as in the second case) or through new 
strategies of social marketing that attributed the meanings to specific technologies and 
constructed their trustworthiness. Relations and networks of power are existent yet different 
under different governance regimes. The branching point analysis stresses the importance of 
developing policy scenarios that take into account existing path dependencies, while the 
analysis maintains the dynamism to integrate the variety of futures and the heterogeneity of 
behaviours developed by different actors. In this way policy scenarios can acquire more 
depth, reflecting the reality that the appraisal and validation of technological solutions are 
social processes and that governance patterns are permeated by relations of power.  
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4. The identification of branching points on the core pathways 
The historical cases summarised above provide examples of branching points at which the 
continuation of the dominant market-led or government-led logic helped to enable a specific 
transition. Also while the civil society logic was largely absent from these examples, the 
agency and role of civil society and consumer groups were important considerations for the 
decision takers who wished to enrol them. In these two cases, the dominance of a particular 
logic was mainly determined by wider landscape-level socio-cultural and political factors that 
influenced the perceived roles and agency of markets, governments and civil society, so the 
logic of the pathway was not fundamentally challenged at these branching points. 
Nevertheless, they demonstrate how actors responded to challenges or opportunities that 
arose which had significant implications for the transition then underway. 
 
As described in section 2, for our three core transition pathways, we aimed to identify 
particular branching points at which the dominant logic in each pathway might be challenged 
at various levels.  We identified an initial set of branching points for our transition pathways 
through several workshop sessions with project team members and external stakeholders, as 
well as through feedback from other stakeholders to presentations at other project meetings 
and conferences. In particular, branching points were proposed and discussed at a workshop 
with project team members and employees of the energy firm E.On at Loughborough in May 
2010 and at a workshop for the project Research Associates and PhD students in Bath in July 
2010. The Loughborough workshop identified branching points for the three pathways, and 
examined criteria for assessing how actors within the pathways might respond at these 
branching points. The Bath workshop identified branching points for the three pathways, and 
discussed potential measures for managing the risks associated with them. A draft approach 
and initial set of branching points were discussed in a small project group meeting at the RSA 
in London in January 2011. The insights from the historical case studies summarised above 
have helped to flesh out the branching points, and a further workshop was held in September 
2011 at Imperial College, to identify analogues for use in the analysis of past branching 
points in electricity regime pathways and to explore typologies of branching points.  From 
these workshops and discussions, a small set of branching points for more detailed analysis 
were developed. Finally, two workshops with industry, academic, policy and NGO 
stakeholders were held in November 2011 to reflect on the proposed branching points and 
DFWRUV¶UHVSRQVHVDQGPLWLJDWLRQVWUDWHJLHV 
 
As noted, we define a branching point as a key decision point on a pathway at which choices 
made by actors, in response to internal or external pressures, determine whether and in what 
ways the pathway is followed. In some circumstances, the choices made at such a point could 
give rise to a coevolutionary sequence of increasing returns that would result in systemic 
changes, such that the original pathway would no longer be followed. As each pathway is 
FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ WKH ORJLF WKDW GHILQHV WKH GRPLQDQW IRUP RI JRYHUQDQFH LQ WKDW SHULRG¶V
action space, this would imply a breakdown in the dominant logic at the branching point. It is 
worth emphasising that at a key branching point D SDWKZD\¶V ORJLF FDQ EH FKDOOHQJHG DW
different levels, including its choice of technologies and/or policies with which to pursue that 
logic. While responses to these challenges can significantly reshape a pathway and its 
technology and policy mix, only some challenges will prove fundamental for its logic. 
 
In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that the choices made by the actors could lead to 
one of the following responses: 
a) Logic of the pathway is reinforced, and pathway continues on the same trajectory; 
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b) Logic of the pathway is challenged, and pathway branches to a new trajectory with a 
mixed logic, more similar to another of our core pathways; 
c) Logic of the pathway is severely challenged, and transition fails. 
 
Firstly, we explore branching points specific to each pathway. Reflection on the pathway 
narratives in stakeholder workshops has highlighted potentially significant branching points 
within each pathway. For each branching point, we identify the choices made by actors that 
could lead to responses of type (a), (b) or (c), and examine strategies for mitigating the risks 
and exploiting the opportunities associated with these branching points. This informs our 
understanding of the plausibility and internal consistency of the pathways, as well as their 
sensitivity and resilience to internal challenges. Secondly, we identify and examine a limited 
set of key branching points across all three pathways. This analysis examines how each 
pathway might be perturbed by an external stimulus, which might include, for example, 
political factors leading to a lower than expected carbon price, or economic factors affecting 
the gas price. The focus in this case, will be how external factors (µnon actor contingent¶
factors (Hughes et al., 2012, this volume)) could affect the pathways in different ways. This 
will examine the robustness of pathways, and compare and contrast responses across 
pathways. The proposed EUDQFKLQJ SRLQWV DQG DFWRUV¶ FKRLFHV DQG response strategies were 
tested at the workshops with project team members and external stakeholders in November 
2011. This aims not only to identify not only defensive strategies for mitigating risks, but also 
strategies for taking advantage of windows of opportunity and stimulating virtuous cycles of 
positive IHHGEDFNVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKµSDWKFUHDWLRQ¶ 
 
5. Analysis of branching points 
As described above, through workshops with internal and external stakeholders, we have 
selected and begun to analyse several initial branching points on our low carbon transition 
pathways, which we discuss in this section. These obviously represent a subset of the possible 
branching points on these pathways, but are ones that the project team and the external 
stakeholders regarded as particularly interesting and relevant for UK energy policy debates. 
 
5.1.  Branching points specific to each pathway 
 
(1) Branching point for the Market Rules pathway: Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is 
assessed in 2020 to be commercially unviable, triggered by failure of costs to fall, 
technology to perform or public to accept, without strong action by central government 
to overcome these.  
 
The logic of the Market Rules pathway is that market mechanisms are the main driver of 
investment in new technologies, and branching points will relate to the perceived failure of 
these mechanisms to deliver outcomes that benefit market actors and keep the pathway on 
track to play its part in meeting the 8.¶V 80% UK greenhouse gas reduction target.  
Branching points can be stimulated by other actors challenging the legitimacy of the market-
based logic, if it is seen as not delivering for climate change or other reasons. If decision 
makers decide that a technology which had been expected to play a crucial role in delivering 
a low carbon transition, such as CCS, is not viable, then this could give rise to an existential 
challenge to the dominant market logic, if this is held to be incapable of delivering the low 
carbon technologies needed. (While a CCS branching point might also occur in the other 
pathways, we suggest that the more significant role of CCS in Market Rules makes this case 
specific to this pathway. This does not rule out examining elsewhere the somewhat different 
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CCS-related branching point that might occur in the Central Coordination pathway, for 
example.)   
 
So, this branching point envisages CCS being assessed in 2020 by large energy firms to be 
commercially unviable. This would create severe challenges and potential conflicts between 
different actors, as the large energy firms consider whether they are willing to invest further 
in the development of this technology and, if so, what further types of support mechanisms 
from government, such as equity stakes in companies pursuing this technology, and/or 
changes to regulatory frameworks, e.g. some form of Emissions Performance Standard 
(DECC, 2011), would be required. 
 
Some potential responses at this branching point are then: 
a) Market actors decide to continue investing in CCS development, in order to achieve 
future costs reductions, driven by expectations of large export markets for successful 
CCS technology; 
b) Market mechanisms judged to be incapable of delivering large-scale low carbon 
technologies, so branch to Central Co-ordination pathway; 
c) Widespread scepticism of achieving carbon reduction targets and concerns about 
energy security lead to renewed investment in unabated coal and gas-fired generation. 
 
Participants at the November workshops argued that, in some ways, this branching point is 
already occurring, with the announcement in October 2011 that the final CCS demonstration 
SODQW WR EH VXSSRUWHG XQGHU WKH 8. JRYHUQPHQW¶V &&6 FRPSHWLWLRQ DW /RQJDQQHW LQ
Scotland, was not going ahead, due to concerns over the returns on investment. Other 
proposed CCS for coal-ILUHG JHQHUDWLRQ GHPRQVWUDWLRQ SURMHFWV VXFK DV (21¶V SODnt at 
Kingsnorth, had already been shelved because of investment and planning concerns. It was 
felt that the private sector will not provide the investment needed (about £1 billion for CCS) 
without major government incentives to make it financially reasonable. The absence of a 
properly functioning worldwide carbon market meant that first mover advantage and IP 
issues were not really seen as significant incentives. Consequently, it was suggested that the 
risk-reward ratio for UK investment in CCS was not good.  
 
How might market actors prepare for and so mitigate the risks associated with this branching 
point? They could undertake a number of strategies. For example: (i) they might invest earlier 
in a larger number of demonstration plants, in order to achieve cost reductions, improved 
performance and greater public acceptance; (ii) they might reduce unrealistic expectations of 
CCS technologies by having a slower pace of demonstration programme, which key actors 
judge to be more realistic; or (iii) they might undertake greater and earlier public 
engagement, which might help to improve public awareness of CCS technologies and 
acceptability of the negative impacts. This could highlight, for example, how local 
communities could benefit from the introduction of CCS technologies either financially or 
through the creation of jobs. Alternatively, market actors might be stimulated to consider 
technological and market-related alternatives to substantial investment in CCS, and to engage 
with the adoption of proactive exit strategies from this technology. More broadly, they could 
evaluate any windows of opportunity opened by the lowered commercial prospects for CCS 
and seek to exploit them. 
 
(2) Branching point for the Central Co-ordination pathway: the Strategic Energy Agency 
fails, due to ineffectiveness and ODFNRIVWDNHKROGHUµEX\LQ¶ 
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The logic of the Central Co-ordination pathway is that strong action by central government is 
needed to persuade other actors to take actions to keep the pathway on track to meet the 80% 
target. In this pathway, this is facilitated by the creation of a powerful Strategic Energy 
Agency that issues and manages contracts for tranches for centralised generation.  Branching 
points could arise from the perceived failure of government and/or its market partners to 
deliver, or if the wider social and economic costs of government action are perceived to be 
too high. In this case, a branching point is associated with the failure of the Strategic Energy 
Agency (SEA) to keep the energy system on track to acKLHYH WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V FDUERQ
reduction targets for the fourth carbon budget period 2023-2027. This could arise through a 
FRPELQDWLRQ RI HYHQWV RQO\ VRPH RI ZKLFK ZRXOG EH XQGHU WKH 6($¶V FRQWURO HJ voter 
discontent with the failure and passed through costs of particular low carbon technologies, or 
industry discontent with a perceived meddlesome, high tax regime. The negotiation of long-
term contracts with electricity generating firms could present a key information asymmetry 
challenge for the SEA, as the industry actors are likely to have more information about likely 
future generation costs and technology performance, and so be able to negotiate contracts that 
are more favourable to the firms than to the SEA, electricity customers or the taxpayer. 
 
Some potential responses at this branching point are: 
a) Government proceeds to a new form of nationalisation of key electricity industry 
assets, driven by public concerns over meeting carbon reduction targets and 
maintaining energy security; 
b) µ%XUHDXFUDWLFLQWHUIHUHQFHDQGLQFRPSHWHQFH¶EODPHGIRUIDLOXUH± move back toward 
market mechanism, but delays in investment decisions and time lost in moving 
towards carbon targets; 
c) Lack of co-ordination and failure to deliver appropriate low carbon capacity and 
demand reduction gives rise to power shortages, which leads to a µWZR-WLHU¶ SULFH-
driven electricity system, in which richer customers get better service and poorer 
customers face intermittent black-outs. 
 
Participants at the November workshops argued that it is unlikely that the UK would move 
towards the re-nationalisation of key electricity infrastructure assets, as in response (a). They 
thought it more likely to move towards a more regulated electricity industry, which also 
would have important repercussions. The government would contract for specific tranches of 
low-carbon generation and the state would introduce more control over the industry but 
would not move towards ownership. In general, it was argued, private companies prefer 
markets, as through market processes, they can establish their interests and can secure higher 
risk but higher return investments. Through this new regulatory regime, a new investment 
regime might be established, based on long-term contracts with a low but guaranteed return 
on investment.  This would be less attractive to private energy companies, but might attract 
investment from insurance and pension companies. This would imply a change in the make-
up of the ownership of the assets in the electricity industry, but could potentially tap into 
significant sources of finance needed for new low-carbon generation.  
 
This could be a significant branching point, as it is hard to see how to branch back to a 
commercial market for generation, if branching reinforces the central co-ordination pathway, 
unless a sufficiently high carbon price were later imposed in order to stimulate low carbon 
investment by market actors. Several energy industry participants felt that there was a danger 
that this type of regulated market for generation would be less innovative, as arguably was 
the case in the regulated market for distribution networks following privatisation in the UK. 
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Government actors could undertake a number of strategies, in order to prepare for and so 
mitigate the risks associated with this branching point. For example, (i) lack of delivery on 
WKH 6($¶V DLPV could lead government actors to consult with the market generation and 
supply actors to see whether and how the issues around incentives to invest might be 
resolved;  (ii) public discontent could lead them to undertake much earlier public 
engagement, well before large measures are planned and they could strive to ensure that 
policies are clear, well presented and transparent; or (iii) government actors could take 
strategic actions to try to avert this branching point by promoting the benefits of this pathway 
to the public, e.g. through promoting WKHFUHDWLRQRIORFDO³*UHHQ-REV´IRUWKHIXWXUH Other 
risk mitigation strategies suggested by stakeholders include: 
- Strategies to increase the capacity and security of the system, in order to guarantee 
the resilience of the system to avoid blackouts.  
- Policies for securing the affordability of electricity and for even distribution of 
energy consumption; policies for overcoming fuel poverty, by economic transfers 
from outside the energy industry. 
- Political stability regarding incentives for investment in low carbon generation. 
- Stable and transparent energy market prices. 
 
(3) Branching point for the Thousand Flowers pathway: µ7RRPXFKWRFDUU\¶ Ln terms of 
the range of actions that need to happen to keep the pathway on track, e.g. the growth 
and performance of Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), the satisfactory development 
of distributed generation (DG), increased prices, improving the energy saving 
performance of the building stock, and the challenges that households might experience 
in engaging with and managing multiple technologies, initiatives and incentives. 
 
The logic of the Thousand Flowers pathway is that civil society actors become convinced of 
the need to act on climate change and decide that neither central government nor market 
actors are likely to deliver sufficient action to keep the pathway on track to meet the 80% 
target. As this would represent a significant change from current pathways, branching points 
could arise from failure of this pathway to take hold, as well as the perceived failure of this 
pathway to deliver sufficient action. The branching point identified here is that this pathway 
IDFHV µWRR PXFK WR FDUU\¶ LH WKHUH DUH too many mutually dependent things that need to 
happen for this pathway to be realised, and so actors become disillusioned with this pathway 
when some of them fail to occur. 
 
Some potential responses at this branching point are: 
a) Community groups take active ownership of local electricity networks to work 
together to overcome problems ± much higher level of social engagement in energy 
provision. 
b) (i) National government steps in to manage problems, and moves back towards 
centralised generation ± branch to Central Co-ordination. 
(ii) Large energy companies step into manage problems and take over community-led 
energy schemes ± branch to Market Rules. 
c) No-one in control of system, and patchwork of different local problems, resulting in 
targets being missed. 
 
Several participants at the November workshops argued that Thousand Flowers represents a 
radically different pathway to that of current market-led or government-led pathways. It 
necessitates changes in the production and usage patterns that cKDOOHQJHVWKHµELJLVEHDXWLIXO¶
approach in the production side and changes the role of DNOs. By giving emphasis to local 
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grids, the architecture of the regime in this pathway is very different both technologically, 
institutionally, economically and socially. Technologically, the physical infrastructure would 
change drastically, as it would resemble more closely the development of virtual networks on 
the internet rather than the current technological infrastructure, LQ ZKLFK WKH µVXSHU JULG¶
provides the core of the problem solving strategies. Due to the different architecture of the 
physical infrastructure that the Thousand Flowers pathway would necessitate, it is likely to be 
difficult to branch to this pathway because existing technological infrastructures have 
momentum. This would require deliberate acts of path creation in order to create virtuous 
cycles of social and technological change needed to go down this pathway, as discussed in 
Foxon (this volume). However, once on this pathway, the significant changes occurring 
would mean that it would then be difficult to branch back to another pathway, because the 
whole architecture of the regime would have changed. This raises challenges of the extent to 
ZKLFKWKLVSDWKZD\ZRXOGWKHQEHµORFNHG LQ¶FUHDWLQJEDUULHUV WRUHDOLVLng responses (b(i)) 
or (b(ii)) at this branching point. The different physical infrastructure would require a 
distribution of production as well as different governance models and institutional 
arrangements, not only locally but nationally. The Thousand Flowers pathway requires new 
interface institutions and would challenge the roles of Ofgem and National Grid. It was 
suggested that energy services might become like platforms on the internet rather than 
commodity delivery services. The concepts of ownership and control infrastructure networks 
would change.  Local control and local ownership might become more important than 
centralised ordered regimes. Transnational networks could get more difficult in a Thousand 
Flowers pathway. New finance schemes with hybrid finance (market and local government 
investments) would be necessary. The Thousand Flowers pathway is more compatible with a 
de-industrialised future and more focused on consumer based energy services (domestic, 
transport, heating etc.) than the other pathways. This pathway would involve a significant 
degree of community leadership. The vision and aspiration that local communities would 
bring to climate change mitigation solutions would influence activities and social practices, 
while local authorities would identify climate change mitigation targets. The local authorities 
could start to acquire new and crucial roles in the sociotechnical transition by coordinating 
the variety of actors that a Thousand Flowers pathway would involve.  
 
In relation to the potential responses to the branching point at which the range of actions 
needed for the Thousand Flowers pathway might become too much to carry, industry 
participants tended to agree that these potential responses were all plausible to some degree, 
though they all required major regulatory and behavioural changes, as well as new ways of 
providing technical and financial assistance to the civil society actors involved. However, 
they tended to favour response (b(ii)), in which large energy companies would change their 
business model to work within a Thousand Flowers framework. Here the companies would 
move towards investing in distributed generation, through providing technical help in 
partnerships with local groups or individuals. Alternatively, small or medium sized 
companies might pop up doing this. However, the pathway in general, and option (b(ii)) in 
particular, would require changes to governance and regulations, to create the possibility for 
new business models and new ways of doing things. 
 
Civil society actors could undertake a number of strategies, in order to prepare for and so 
mitigate the risks associated with this branching point. For example, (i) local community 
groups could establish ways of sharing knowledge and insights with other groups through 
social networks, in order to disseminate more widely local solutions to particular problems to 
take advantage of any opportunties that may have arisen; and (ii) they could lobby for active 
government support to be given to local community groups, rather than to large energy firms. 
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5.2.  Branching point across the three pathways 
Branching point DFURVV WKH WKUHH SDWKZD\V 'LVSXWHV DERXW WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI µVPDUW
JULGVPDUW FRQWURO¶ HJ GR EHQHILWV JR PDLQO\ WR SURGXFHUV RU FRQVXPHUV WULJJHUHG E\
competing visions of smart grids, and do consumers interpret such developments as 
unwarranted intrusions or infringements of liberty by market or government actors?  
 
Potential responses at this branching point are: 
a) Current market actors (large electricity companies) perceive the benefits to them of 
the smart grid, in relation to more effective management of the electricity system and 
so invest in smart grid control technologies ± while consumers are still seen in 
relatively passive roles; 
b) The smart grid is seen more as an enabling technology to incorporate distributed 
generation, microgeneration and demand side developments, led by new entrants to 
industry, such as ICT companies and user interface companies; 
c) Discordant visions of the smart grid and smart controls slow down developments and 
prevents the realisation of their benefits. 
 
Participants at the November workshops argued that the current UK government targets for 
every home to have a smart meter by 2020 creates an incentive for using current designs for 
smart meters, which could lead to a possible lock-in into a minimal definition of µsmart¶ with 
benefits primarily to market actors. This might lead to a possible backlash against the 
perception of the market as the key beneficiary, as well as against issues of control and 
invasion of privacy. This might especially be an issue on the Market Rules pathway. 
 
The role of different actors was also argued to be significant. Distribution network operators 
were said to be conservative and might not see any benefit from a smart grid, as a higher use 
RI WKH QHWZRUN µVZHDWLQJ WKHLU DVVHWV¶ PLJKW QRW EH DWWUDFWLYH WR them. Customers might 
consider that ZKRLVSURPRWLQJDQGVHOOLQJµVPDUW¶would be important in terms of trust and 
perception. If the state were to play this role, it might be viewed to be intrusive, as was the 
case with the subsequently scrapped proposal for national ID-cards. If the energy companies 
play the role, it might be viewed more like a reward card offered by major supermarkets, 
which consumers might more readily accept, as it would offer identifiable benefits to them. If 
a major IT firm were to play this role, it might be seen as an innovative way of using energy. 
Thus, it was argued, who sells will affect how it is received. An aspect of µsmart¶ is that a 
more advanced or complex tariff will be needed and people would then need to sign up to 
this. The issue concerns not just a piece of µkit¶ but also regulatory frameworks, again 
providing space for different perceptions of who might lose or win. 
 
For µsmart¶ to work in terms of reducing the need for expensive peaking plants, it was 
suggested that it must work technologically. Government software projects often have not 
delivered, so an important issue would be whether either government or companies could 
deliver. Power companies might not know their customers well enough, so a major retailer or 
IT firm might perhaps be more likely to deliver successfully. 
 
The risk mitigation strategies were said to depend on how the problem might be perceived. If 
µsmart¶ were initially seen negatively or apathetically as just showing how customers much 
money they spent and not allowing them to do anything about their spending, this perception 
might be changed by increasing what the system offered. The possibility of doing this might 
differ between pathways. It was suggested that another approach might be to give customers 
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a strong choice between smart technology or increased investment for which they would have 
to pay. This was said to be more likely in Central Co-ordination or Thousand Flowers, while 
quite unlikely in Market Rules.  
 
Leading actors could undertake a number of strategies, in order to prepare for and so mitigate 
the risks associated with this branching point and/or to take advantage of any opportunities 
that might arise. For example, (i) government actors might ensure that a wider public debate 
is undertaken around visions of the smart grid, leading to agreements that enable greater 
accord among different actors about how benefits and costs are to be shared; or (ii) they 
might actively work to achieve greater public acceptance of and engagement with smart 
control processes. 
 
The branching points discussed in this section illustrate that steps along a low-carbon 
pathways matter, and WKDW µJHWting there from here¶ LV D SDWK-dependent process in which 
progress can be challenged by events and pressures, and shaped or re-VKDSHG E\ DFWRUV¶
agency in relation to their logics and to the threats and opportunities they perceive. In the 
next section we discuss how insights from this branching point analysis could inform 
proactive thinking and decision-making.  
 
6. How might branching point analysis inform decision making? 
The above examples of the analysis of branching points along our core transition pathways 
illustrate how they may be used as a tool to elicit stakeholder reflections on potential 
responses of actors and risk mitigation strategies at these points. Here, we examine the extent 
to which this type of branching point analysis can begin to incorporate the path dependent 
and actor contingent nature of energy systems change into future pathways or scenarios. As 
described in Foxon (2012, this volume), our transition pathways approach aims to more 
explicitly incorporate social structures and agency, including institutions and politics, into 
future energy studies (cf. Wangel, 2011; Nilsson et al., 2011). The approach thus aims to 
provide insight into KRZ DFWRUV¶ GHFLVLRQV HQDEOH FKDQJHV WR KDSSHQ DQG KRZ LQVWLWXWLRQV
constrain or enable this decision making. 
 
This builds on thinking about different potential uses of long-term socio-technical scenarios. 
Hughes et al. (2012, this volume) argue that while reflection on long term futures is a 
complex activity with an uncertain epistemology, scenarios can XVHIXOO\ GLVWLQJXLVK µDFtor 
FRQWLQJHQW¶HOHPHQWVWKDWUHIOHFWGHYHORSPHQWVZKLFKDUHZLWKLQWKHSRZHURIV\VWHPVDFWRUV
WR FKDQJH RU EULQJ DERXW IURP µSUH-GHWHUPLQHG HOHPHQWV¶ ZLWKLQ WKH V\VWHP, arising from 
fixed actor motivations, DQG H[WHUQDO µQRQ-DFWRUFRQWLQJHQW HOHPHQWV¶ which system actors 
cannot influence. Pre-determined and non-actor contingent elements prompt the need for 
protective decision making, in which scenario users take action to increase robustness of 
pathways against internal and external threats; whilst actor-contingent elements suggest the 
need for proactive decision making, in which scenario users identify opportunities to 
intervene on and influence the system, or for consensus building, in which diverse actors 
come together to engage in moving towards a common goal (Hughes et al. 2012, this 
volume). The analysis of branching points on the pathways is intended to offer insights that 
will inform actors of opportunities for the kinds of proactive and protective decision making 
and societal consensus building that Hughes et al. have described.  
For example, the branching point associated with the failure of carbon capture and storage 
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(CCS) technologies in the Market Rules pathway may be argued to have both actor-
contingent and non-actor contingent elements, as the success of these technologies will 
depend both on the investment and effort applied to their development in the UK, and on 
physical and institutional factors affecting their viability in the UK and the investment and 
effort applied to their development by actors outside the UK energy system. This suggests 
that the likely success of this pathway will then depend on proactive decisions by large 
energy firms to invest in technology demonstration and on efforts to build a public and 
political consensus for institutional and financial support for this technology, as well as the 
need for protective decision making for the development of alternative technologies, should 
CCS not prove viable in the UK context. Similarly, the branching point associated with the 
failure of the Strategic Energy Agency (SEA) in the Central Co-ordination pathway 
illustrates the need for building a consensus around the aims and functioning of this Agency, 
if this pathway were to be followed. 
The reaction of different actors to the µWRRPXFKWRFDUU\¶branching point associated with the 
Thousand Flowers pathway is likely to depend strongly on their views of the feasibility and 
desirability of this pathway. Civil society actors might reflect on proactive decisions needed 
to strengthen the resilience of this pathways and the need to enrol a wider range of actors in 
order to build a consensus for support amongst publics, policy makers and new entrant 
ESCOs for the actions needed to realise this pathway. Government and market actors might 
reflect on the need for protective decision making to enable government or market actors to 
step in to address problems that may arise if other actors choose to follow this pathway. 
 
Reflecting on these specific examples thus illuminates the potential of this type of branching 
points DQDO\VLVWRLQIRUPDFWRUV¶thinking and decision making in relation to future transition 
pathways. Firstly, an understanding of historical branching points in the energy services 
sector helps to appreciate the complexity and the dynamic processes of decision making at 
critical points on a transition pathway, as well as issues of path dependence. By studying the 
processes of enrolment and network building that actors undertook at past branching points, 
we can better understand the process of governing transitions and explore how competing 
µORJLFV¶ were debated, finally established and maintained during past transitions. This can 
provide a richer UHFRQVWUXFWLRQ RI WKH µORJLFV¶ RI PDUNHW VWDWH DQG PRUH SDUWLFLSDWRU\
governance patterns as they developed in the past. It informs our understanding of the 
structure and dynamics of transitions and draws helpful insights into processes of lock-in or 
lock-out, as well as path dependence and path creation. Secondly, the study of potential 
future branching points matters because decisions taken at them can exert significant 
influences on the nature, magnitude and timing of transition pathways.  Thirdly, in positing 
future transition pathways, we try to anticipate and understand key choices, opportunities and 
constraints that different actor groups might face along a pathway. So, government, market 
and civil society actors will want to scope the potentially significant pathway-influencing 
pressures and responses that they and other actors might experience. In this way, they might 
be better prepared to understand both the opportunities and the constraints that could 
influence progress along (and the nature of) a pathway, and hence be able to address them 
more effectively than they otherwise would have done. This relates to areas ranging from 
policy strategies and the choice of instruments, to technology development and deployment 
and to participation in market or non-market activities and behaviours. 
Thus it matters to understand how a pathway might develop, the pressures and tensions that 
potentially significant actors could face and their responses in the face of them. The literature 
on lock-in, path dependence and path creation has shown how future pathways and the 
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options and choices on them can be shaped and constrained by decisions made at past 
branching points. Similarly, other parts of the innovation literature have shown the 
importance of windows of opportunity and the possibilities of virtuous and vicious cycles. 
We argue that analysis of branching points could help actors to take better account of these 
aspects of the dynamics of pathway development. 
 
7. Conclusions and next steps 
In this paper, we have shown how, through the development and socio-technical analysis of 
transition pathways (taking account of governance, agency and the interactions between 
different actor groups) and undertaking a series of stakeholder workshops, we identified and 
analysed a set of plausible branching points in order to illuminate the dynamics and choices 
along those pathways. We have also shown how understanding the steps along pathways 
through this kind of analysis can enable actors more effectively to anticipate and shape them.  
This paper has argued that the study of branching points can add theoretical understanding 
and policy relevance to the investigation of low carbon transition pathways. We have shown 
how an understanding of historical branching points in the energy services sector informs 
understanding of the complexity and dynamic processes of decision making at critical points 
in transitions. It shows how key actors try to enrol other actors and build networks to 
UHLQIRUFH WKHLU µORJLF¶ RU IUDPLQJ RI LVVXHV 7KLV KLJKOLJKWV KRZ XQGHU WKH ULJKW
circumstances, both market-led and government-led transitions can achieve a balance of co-
ordination and freedom for experimentation needed for a successful transition. The historical 
evidence also suggests that it is useful to explore potential future branching points, as these 
could exert significant influence on the nature, magnitude and timing of transition pathways.  
Doing this should help to anticipate and understand key choices that different actor groups 
may face along a pathway, and by exploring the possible choices and the pressures that 
motivate and lead to them, enable these actors to better understand how to prepare for and 
address them. Our analysis shows that the governance of successful transitions relies on both 
the overall framing or logic that is dominant, and the decisions of actors following these 
logics at key branching points. Thus our approach incorporates significant roles for both 
agency and structure, and aims to provide a balance between action and reflection in the 
governance of socio-technical transitions. 
In future work, we aim to further develop the relevance and usefulness of the branching 
points approach described here, and to identify and explore further potential branching points 
on the core transition pathways. We will also identify and examine other past branching 
points, in search of patterns, insights and typologies that might inform understanding of, and 
agency in relation to, prospective branching points on pathways to a low carbon future. 
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